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Assessing the Constitutionality of North Carolina's New
Obscenity Law
For decades the United States Supreme Court has wrestled with the delicate
problem of regulating obscenity and pornography. In 1957 the Court in Roth v.
United States I held that materials found obscene were outside the protection of
the first amendment2 and thus subject to state regulation. 3 Determining an ob-
jective standard of obscenity, however, has proved a troublesome task. As one
commentator has noted, "[o]ne person's obscenity is another's art, and yet an-
other's comedy."'4
In recent years the problem of setting appropriate standards for the regula-
tion of obscenity has been aggravated by a growing concern over the spread of
child pornography and the sexual exploitation of children.5 Recent increases in
the incidence of "kiddie porn"' 6 have prompted state legislation that attempts to
deal with and control the child pornography problem.7 Because the welfare of
minors is involved, many of these state regulations seek to suppress materials
that are outside the legal definition of obscenity.8
Although North Carolina has lagged behind other states in recognizing and
combatting child pornography, 9 recent amendments to North Carolina's obscen-
ity law have attempted to bring the state into the mainstream regulatory view.
1. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
2. The first amendment provides, in part, that "Congress shall make no law... abridging the
freedom of speech .... ." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
3. Roth, 354 U.S. at 485. For a discussion of Roth, see infra text accompanying notes 49-55.
4. A. DERSHOWITZ, THE BEST DEFENSE 163 (1982).
5. See generally Sexual Exploitation of Children: Hearings on H.R. 4751 Before the Subcomm.
on Crime of the House Comm. of the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) [hereinafter Hearings]
(documenting the growing concern over the sexual exploitation of children in this country).
6. See Hearings, supra note 5; Anson, The Last Porno Show, NEw TIMES, June 24, 1977,
reprinted in Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation: Hearings Before Subcomm. to Inves-
tigate Juvenile Delinquency of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 150-58
(1977); Martin, Child's Garden of Perversity, TIME, Apr. 4, 1977, at 55; Kiddie Porn, "60 Minutes,"
vol. IX, no.33, May 15, 1977, reprinted in Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation, Hear-
ings Before the Subcomm. to Investigate Juvenile Delinquency of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. 123-30 (1977).
7. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 749 (1982). At the time Ferber was decided forty-
seven states had enacted legislation aimed at halting the production of child pornography. Thirty-
five states had passed statutes prohibiting distribution of these materials. Id.
8. Id. The Ferber Court noted that "20 States prohibit the distribution of material depicting
children engaged in sexual conduct without requiring that the material be legally obscene." Id.
9. Until 1971 North Carolina's obscenity laws made no mention of child pornography. In
1971 the general assembly added § 14-190.6 to the general statutes. This section, titled "Employing
or permitting minor to assist in offense under Article," read:
Every person 18 years of age or older who intentionally, in any manner, hires, employs,
uses or permits any minor under the age of 16 years to do or assist in doing any act or thing
constituting an offense under this Article and involving any material, act or thing he knows
or reasonably should know to be obscene within the meaning of G.S. 14-190.1, shall be
guilty of a misdemeanor, and unless a greater penalty is expressly provided for in this
Article, shall be punishable in the discretion of the court.
Act Prohibiting the Dissemination of Obscenity, ch. 405, § 1, 1971 N.C. Sess. Laws 334, 338 (codi-
fied as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-190.6 (Supp. 1985)).
OBSCENITY LAW
This Note reviews the significant and recent changes in North Carolina's ob-
scenity law and assesses the constitutionality of these changes in light of the
United States Supreme Court's decisions in this area. It concludes that,
although the new statute generally appears to conform to these decisions, the
change from a statewide standard of obscenity to a community standard embod-
ied in the amendments raises equal protection questions that might render the
new law unconstitutional.
Prior to the recent amendments to North Carolina's obscenity law,' ° the
statute contained several notable provisions. First, the obscenity statute made it
unlawful to disseminate obscenity intentionally in any public place.11 Dissemi-
nation was defined broadly to include, among other acts, the sale or delivery of
obscene representations, the presentment or direction of an obscene perform-
ance, and the publishing or exhibiting of anything obscene. 12 Furthermore, ma-
terial was considered obscene if: (1) the material depicted actual sexual conduct
in a patently offensive way; (2) the average person applying contemporary stan-
dards would find that the material as a whole appealed to a prurient interest in
sex; and (3) the material lacked serious literary, artistic, political, educational, or
scientific value. 13
Under the prior statute obscenity was judged with reference to typical
adults. However, if it appeared from the character of the material or the cir-
cumstances of its dissemination that the dissemination was directed at children
or other susceptible audiences, the material would be judged with reference to
children or the susceptible audience.' 4 The statute also provided for an adver-
sary hearing prior to the seizure of materials or leveling of criminal charges.15
The purpose of the hearing was to determine whether the material or act in
question was in fact obscene.1 6
With respect to minors the earlier statute provided penalties for any adult
who involved a person under sixteen years of age in an obscenity offense. 17
Adults found disseminating obscene materials to minors were guilty of a misde-
meanor;18 in the event the minor was younger than twelve, the offense consti-
tuted a felony.19 In addition, under the old statute the dissemination of sexually
oriented materials to anyone under eighteen years of age was a misdemeanor,20
as was the public display of sexually oriented materials. 21
10. Act of July 11, 1985, ch. 703, 1985 N.C. Sess. Laws 929.
11. Act Prohibiting the Dissemination of Obscenity, ch. 405, § 1, 1971 N.C. Sess. Laws 334,
334 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-190.1(a) (Supp. 1985)).
12. Id. (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-190.1(a)(1)-(4) (Supp. 1985)).
13. Id. § 1, at 334-35 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-190.1(b)-(c) (Supp. 1985)).
14. Id. § 1, at 335 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-190.1(d) (Supp. 1985)).
15. Id., repealed by Act of July 11, 1985, ch. 703, § 2, 1985 N.C. Sess. Laws 929, 930.
16. Act Prohibiting the Dissemination of Obscenity, ch. 405, § 1, 1971 N.C. Sess. Laws 334,
335 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-190.1 (Supp. 1985)).
17. Id. at 338 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-190.6 (Supp. 1985)).
18. Id. (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-190.7 (Supp. 1985)).
19. Id. (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-190.8 (Supp. 1985)).
20. Id. (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-190.10 (Supp. 1985)).
21. Id. (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-190.11 (Supp. 1985)).
1987]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
In 1985 the North Carolina General Assembly passed significant amend-
ments to the obscenity statute.22 The amendments made important changes in
existing obscenity standards and provided additional protection for minors
against harmful sexual materials and conduct.23 The amendments included
both procedural and substantive changes that tended to broaden the scope of
materials subject to regulation and to ease obstacles to enforcement. 24
Substantively, the obscenity standards are affected by the new statutory
provisions in several ways. First, the new provisions deleted the public place
requirement from the statute, thus allowing enforcement personnel to prohibit
dissemination of obscene materials in both public and private places. 25 Prior to
this change, enforcement personnel were unable to prohibit dissemination of ob-
scene materials in places that were deemed private. As a result, sellers were able
to disseminate obscenity through the ruse of private clubs or organizations.
Second, the new provisions also deleted the statewide standard of obscenity
from the statute in favor of a community standard.26 This change allows local
prosecutors to determine what their constituency finds offensive and to enforce
the law accordingly. Thus, what may be obscene in one county may be permissi-
ble in another.
Third, the new provisions added simulated intercourse to actual intercourse
in the obscenity statute's definition of "sexual conduct."'27 This change broad-
ened the category of materials subject to scrutiny under the law and put to rest
arguments made by distributors of obscene materials that if the sexual acts de-
picted are not real; but merely simulated, the materials cannot be legally
obscene.
Last, the amendments elevated violations of the obscenity statute to harsher
misdemeanors or low-grade felonies. 28 For example, prior to the statute's
amendment the sale of an obscene movie would have been a misdemeanor of-
fense.29 Under the new statute the same act would constitute a class J felony.30
Similarly, the production of an obscene play, the sale of an obscene book, and
the renting of an obscene film all represent felony violations under the amended
statute.3 1
22. Act of July 11, 1985, ch. 703, 1985 N.C. Sess. Laws 929 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT.
§§ 14-190.1 to .20 (Supp. 1985)).
23. See id.
24. The amendments to the obscenity statute became effective on October 1, 1985. Id. § 10, at
935. For an overview of the amendments and a discussion of the impact they had during the first
year they were effective, see Davis, First year of obscenity law eventful, News and Observer (Raleigh,
N.C.), Sept. 28, 1986, at 39A, col. 1 and New obscenity law tested in N. C. Courts, News and Observer
(Raleigh, N.C.), Sept. 28, 1986, at 40A, col. 1.
25. Act of July 11, 1985, ch. 703, § 1, 1985 N.C. Sess. Laws 929, 929 (codified at N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 14-190.1(c)(1) (Supp. 1985)).
26. Id. (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-190.1(b)(2) (Supp. 1985)).
27. Id. (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-190.1(c)(1) (Supp. 1985)).
28. See id. § 9, at 931-34 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-190.11 to .16 (Supp. 1985)).
29. Act Prohibiting the Dissemination of Obscenity, ch. 405, § 1, 1971 N.C. Sess. Laws 334,
337 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-190.1(g) (Supp. 1985)).
30. Act of July 11, 1985, ch. 703, § 1, 1985 N.C. Sess. Laws 929, 930 (codified at N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 14-190.1(g) (Supp. 1985)).
31. Id. (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-190.1(a)-(g) (Supp. 1985)).
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Procedurally, the amendments deleted the requirement of an adversary
hearing prior to a seizure of evidence or criminal prosecution for obscenity viola-
tions. 32 The prior statute required law enforcement personnel to submit a com-
plaint to a judge before they could seize evidence or file criminal charges. The
judge would then summon the parties for a full adversary hearing on the obscen-
ity issue. If the judge found the materials obscene under the statute, he or she
then issued warrants for seizure of the materials and for criminal prosecution of
the party in violation of the statute.33
By deleting this hearing requirement, the amendments eased the burden on
law enforcement personnel seeking prosecutions under the obscenity law. Under
the amended statute, warrants for seizure or criminal process now "may be is-
sued only upon the request of a prosecutor."' 34 Local district attorneys have
discretion under the amended statute to decide what their constituencies con-
sider obscene and enforce the law accordingly. The trier of fact will then make
the ultimate determination of obscenity at trial, subject to appellate review.
The amended statute also provides a comprehensive framework for address-
ing the problem of sexual exploitation of minors. First, the amendments added a
definitional section to the statute.35 The amended statute defines as "harmful to
minors... any material or performance that depicts sexually explicit nudity or
sexual activity [which an] average adult applying contemporary community
standards" would find to: (1) "[have] a predominant tendency to appeal to a
prurient interest of minors in sex"; (2) "[be] patently offensive.., concerning
what is suitable for minors"; and (3) "[lack] serious literary, artistic, political, or
scientific value for minors."' 36 The new definition in effect establishes a separate
category of obscenity geared toward the protection of minors.
The amended statute defines "material" as "[p]ictures, drawings, video
recordings, films, or other visual depictions or representations," but excludes
entirely written works.37 A minor under the amended statute is defined as any
"individual who is less than 18 years old and is not married or judicially emanci-
pated."'3 8 In addition to this, sexual activity39 and sexually explicit
32. Id. § 2, at 930.
33. Act Prohibiting the Dissemination of Obscenity, ch. 405, § 1, 1971 N.C. Sess. Laws 334,
335-37, repealed by Act of July 11, 1985, ch. 703, § 2, 1985 N.C. Sess. Laws 929, 930.
34. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-190.20 (Supp. 1985).
35. Act of July 11, 1985, ch. 703, § 9, 1985 N.C. Sess. Laws 929, 930-31 (codified at N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 14-190.13 (Supp. 1985)).
36. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-190.13(1) (Supp. 1985).
37. Id. § 14-190.13(2).
38. Id. § 14-190.13(3).
39. "Sexual activity" is defined as any of the following acts:
a. Masturbation, whether done alone or with another human or an animal.
b. Vaginal, anal, or oral intercourse, whether done with another human or with an animal.
c. Touching, in an act of apparent sexual stimulation or sexual abuse, of the clothed or
unclothed genitals, pubic area, or buttocks of another person or the clothed or unclothed
breasts of a human female.
d. An act or condition that depicts torture, physical restraint by being fettered or bound,
or flagellation of or by a person clad in undergarments or in a revealing or bizarre costume.
e. Excretory functions.
f. The insertion of any part of a person's body, other than the male sexual organ, or of any
1987]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
nudity4° are specifically defined. Read in conjunction with the "harmful to mi-
nors" requirements, the broad definitions of sexual activity and nudity contained
in the amended statute provide the framework for offenses punishable under the
amended statute.
Offenses under the amended statute flow naturally from the definitions.
The new law makes it illegal to display or disseminate to minors materials con-
sidered harmful to minors or to exhibit harmful performances to a minor.
41
Also, the direct use of a minor in sexual activity for purposes of a live perform-
ance or production of a visual representation is deemed first degree sexual ex-
ploitation of a minor and is a class G felony under the amended statute.42
Moreover, the trier of fact is allowed to infer that a person depicted as a minor is
a minor,4 3 and the defendant may not allege mistake of age as a defense.44 The
amended statute also contains a second degree sexual exploitation offense. This
offense is defined as contributing to the production or dissemination of a visual
representation of a minor engaged in sexual activity, and it is subject to the same
inferences as first degree sexual exploitation. 4 5 The amended statute also pro-
hibits the promotion of or participation in the prostitution of a minor.
46
Overall, the amendments are intended to facilitate the prosecution of those
involved in obscene activities, with a special emphasis on eliminating child por-
nography and the sexual exploitation of children. In providing this special em-
phasis, the amendments created a subcategory of obscenity---obscenity involving
minors-that appears to be outside the bounds of the United States Supreme
Court's definition of materials denied first amendment protection due to obscene
content. Before assessing the constitutionality of the new law, however, a brief
review of past United States Supreme Court decisions in this area is required.
Initially, it must be admitted that "obscenity is what five Justices of the
object into another person's anus or vagina, except when done as part of a recognized
medical procedure.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-190.13(5) (Supp. 1985).
40. "Sexually explicit nudity" is defined as the showing of:
a. Uncovered, or less than opaquely covered, human genitals, pubic area, or buttocks, or
the nipple or any portion of the areola of the human female breast; or
b. Covered human male genitals in a discernibly turgid state.
Id. § 14-190.13(6).
41. Id. §§ 14-190.14, .15.
42. Id. § 14-190.16. A class G felony is punishable by "imprisonment up to 15 years, a fine, or
both." Id. § 14-1.1. The amended obscenity statute stipulates a sentence of at least six years. Id.
§ 14-190.16(d). Further, good behavior credit may not reduce the term to less than three years, and
suspension or probation is prohibited. Id.
43. Id. § 14-190.16(b).
44. Id. § 14-190.16(c).
45. Id. § 14-190.17. Second degree sexual exploitation is punishable as a class H felony. Id. A
class H felony is punishable by "imprisonment up to 10 years, or a fine, or both." Id. § 14-1.1(a)(8).
The amended statute mandates a sentence of not less than four years. Id. § 14-190.17(d). Further,
good behavior may not reduce the term to less than two years, and suspension or probation is pro-
hibited. Id.
46. Id. §§ 14-190.18, .19. Promotion is punishable in the same manner as first degree sexual
exploitation. Id. § 14-190.16; see supra note 42. Participation is punishable in the same manner as
second degree sexual exploitation. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-190.17 (Supp. 1985); see supra note 45.
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Supreme Court say it is at any given time." 47 In the realm of obscenity "[e]very
Justice has his own standards, and they are just as likely to reflect individual
tastes, hangups, and upbringing as they do constitutional doctrine or prece-
dent."'48 The purpose of this Note is not to decide what should and should not
be afforded the protection of the first amendment. Rather, its purpose is to out-
line current constitutional doctrines on obscenity and to determine how these
doctrines affect North Carolina's amended obscenity law.
In 1957 the United States Supreme Court held in Roth v. United States49
"that obscenity is not within the area of constitutionally protected speech or
press."'50 For the first time, the Court in Roth announced standards for deter-
mining obscenity. Under Roth obscenity was to be judged by "whether to the
average person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant
theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest."' 5 1
In so holding "the Court instituted for issues of obscenity a dual level con-
cept of speech, premised on the assumption that a qualitative distinction exists
between obscene speech and speech entitled to the protection of the first amend-
ment."' 52 Writing for the majority, Justice Brennan warned that although the
Court was willing to limit constitutionally protected speech to safeguard com-
pelling interests, standards for judging obscenity should be construed so as not
to interfere with materials that do not "treat sex in a manner appealing to pruri-
ent interest."15 3 Therefore, the Court recognized the fundamental need to distin-
guish between the two levels of speech in this area: one protected, the other
not.54 Difficulties faced by the lower courts in interpreting this distinction led
the Court to infuse additional criteria into the obscenity formula.55
Over the next few years the Court announced additional standards and
rules that further complicated an already ambiguous obscenity doctrine. In
47. A. DERSHOWITZ, supra note 4, at 164.
48. A. DERSHOWrrZ, supra note 4, at 164. Professor Dershowitz discusses some of the individ-
ual Justices' standards for obscenity. According to Dershowitz, Justice Stewart used the famous "I
know it when I see it" test. Justice White's clerks referred to his standard as "the angle of the
dangle" rule, referring to the degree of erection and penetration the Justice found necessary for a
finding of obscenity. Chief Justice Warren applied a "Would my daughters be offended?" test. Id. at
163-64.
49. 354 U.S. 476 (1957). Defendant in Roth was convicted by the district court for "mailing
obscene circulars and advertising, and an obscene book, in violation of the federal obscenity statute."
The Court affirmed his conviction. Id. at 503.
50. Id. at 485.
51. Id. at 489. The Court defined "prurient" as "[i]tching; longing; uneasy with desire or long-
ing; of persons, having itching, morbid, or lascivious longings; of desire, curiosity, or propensity,
lewd...." Id. at 487 n.20 (quoting WEBsTER's NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (unabridged
2d ed. 1949)).
52. Hardy, Miller v. California & Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton: The Obscenity Doctrine
Reformulated, 6 COLUM. HUM. R-s. L. REv. 219, 220 (1974).
53. Roth, 354 U.S. at 488.
54. Hardy, supra note 52, at 220.
55. Hardy, supra note 52, at 221. The state and lower federal courts found it difficult to draw
an accurate dividing line between protected and unprotected speech using the Roth standard. Out of
sympathy for the lower courts and a desire to limit an excess of obscenity regulation, the Court soon
introduced the "patently offensive" requirement, see infra notes 56-57 and accompanying text, and
the "utterly without social importance" requirement, see infra text accompanying notes 58-59.
Hardy, supra note 52, at 221.
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Manual Enterprises v. Day 56 Justice Harlan, writing for the majority, stated that
material must be "so offensive on [its] face as to affront current community stan-
dards of decency" to be judged obscene.5 7 In Jacobellis v. Ohio 58 Justice Bren-
nan's plurality opinion introduced the "utterly without redeeming social
importance" test into the obscenity arena.5 9 In Jacobellis Brennan also con-
cluded that "contemporary community standards" translated into a national
standard, not a host of local standards.
6 0
In 1966 the Court decided two companion cases that further complicated
the obscenity doctrine. In Ginzburg v. United States6 1 the Court added the
"pandering" rule, which allowed a finding of obscenity when the marketing of
material was designed to appeal to erotic interests. 62 Material advertised in this
manner could be found obscene "even though in other contexts the material
would escape such condemnation."' 63 In Memoirs v. Massachusetts 64 the Court,
adopting Justice Brennan's Jacobellis test, held that allegedly obscene materials
must be "utterly without redeeming social value" before first amendment protec-
tion might be denied. 65 Writing for the Court, Justice Brennan rejected a test
that would weigh the material's social value against its offensive nature and pru-
rient appeal, requiring instead that all three of these criteria be applied indepen-
dently. 66 However, in this first attempt to synthesize the doctrinal changes since
Roth, the Court could muster only a plurality of three.67
56. 370 U.S. 478 (1962). In Manual Enterprises the Court addressed a ruling by the United
States Post Office Department that certain magazines were obscene and thus nonmailable under
provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1964). The Court reversed the ruling and added a "patent offensive-
ness" standard to the prurient interest standard of Roth. Manual Enterprises, 370 U.S. at 479-82.
57. Manual Enterprises, 370 U.S. at 482.
58. 378 U.S. 184 (1964). In Jacobellis the manager of a motion picture theater in Ohio was
convicted at trial of possessing and exhibiting an obscene film in violation of Ohio law. The Court
reversed the conviction on the grounds that the film was not obscene under Roth. Id. at 185-96.
59. Id. at 191.
60. Id. at 192-94.
61. 383 U.S. 463 (1966). In Ginzburg a judge of the Federal District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania convicted Ginzburg and three corporations controlled by him for violations
of the federal obscenity statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1964). The prosecution charged the offense based
on the production, sale, and publicity of materials and assumed that, standing alone, the publications
might not be obscene. Apparently, Ginzburg had sought mailing privileges from the postmasters of
Intercourse, Pennsylvania, and Blue Ball, Pennsylvania. Because these facilities were not capable of
handling the volume of mailings, privileges were obtained from Middlesex, New Jersey. Ginzburg,
383 U.S. at 464-68. The Supreme Court upheld the conviction on the basis that "[w]here the pur-
veyor's sole emphasis is on the sexually provocative aspects of his publications, that fact may be
decisive in the determination of obscenity." Id. at 470.
62. Ginzburg, 383 U.S. at 474.
63. Id. at 475-76.
64. 383 U.S. 413 (1966). In Memoirs the Massachusetts Attorney General filed a civil equity
action to have the book Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure (commonly known as Fanny Hill), written
by John Cleland in about 1750, declared obscene. A publisher of the book intervened in the action.
The trial court found the book to be obscene and the Massachusetts Supreme Court affirmed the
judgment. The United States Supreme Court reversed because the book was not "utterly without
redeeming social value." Id. at 415-19.
65. Id. at 419.
66. Id.
67. Six Justices disagreed with this test. Justices Black and Douglas rejected any regulation of
speech and press as violative of the first amendment. Ginzburg, 383 U.S. at 476 (Black, J., dissent-
ing) (a companion case to Memoirs); Memoirs, 383 U.S. at 433 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Justice
Clark argued for maintaining the Roth standard with prurient interest as the keystone. Memoirs,
[Vol. 65
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Just when the Court seemed least likely to agree on any uniform standard
for treating obscenity issues, it appeared to escape the moral debate of past deci-
sions in favor of a more mechanical approach in Redrup v. New York .68 In a per
curiam decision the Court reviewed several obscenity cases-without hearing
argument-and, using a "clear and present danger" 69 test, found that none of
the works in question were obscene. The Court's previous definitional approach
appeared to have been replaced by a new three-pronged test. The Redrup Court
noted that in none of the cases before it had the state argued: (T) "a limited state
concern for juveniles,"; (2) "an assault upon individual privacy" through obtru-
sive publication; or (3) the type of "pandering" found in Ginzburg.70 Although
it did not expressly overrule Roth, the Redrup Court appeared to take a new
direction in dealing with the obscenity issue.
The 1969 case of Stanley v. Georgia7 ' implicitly reaffirmed the new ap-
proach adopted by the Court in Redrup. In holding that the state cannot pro-
hibit obscenity in the privacy of the home, the Stanley Court applied a balancing
of competing interests test.72 One commentator noted, "the Court, at least for
the time being, had embarked on the new path (new for obscenity cases-tradi-
tional for other free speech cases) of balancing the competing interests to deter-
mine the difference between legal obscenity and illegal obscenity and using as the
counterweight the concept of harm." 73 Although the Court in Stanley appeared
to rally around a new approach for deciding obscenity cases, individual Justices
still held differing opinions on the obscenity issue.74
An infusion of new Justices on the Court7 5 led to a further restructuring of
obscenity doctrine in 1973. In Miller v. California7 6 the Court attempted to ease
383 U.S. at 441-42 (Clark, J., dissenting). Justice Stewart felt that only "hard-core" pornography
was outside the first amendment. Ginzburg, 383 U.S. at 499 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Justice White
argued for application of both the prurient interest and patent offensiveness standards in establishing
obscenity. Memoirs, 383 U.S. at 462 (White. J., dissenting). Justice Harlan made obscenity a feder-
alism issue, asserting that states have a greater interest than the federal government in curbing ob-
scenity and should therefore be allowed some discretion in determining what is unprotected. Id. at
456 (Harlan, J., dissenting). For a discussion of the Justices' opinions, see Hardy, supra note 52, at
222 & n.16.
68. 386 U.S. 767 (1967).
69. Rosenblum, The Judicial Politics of Obscenity, 3 PEPPERDINE L. REv. 1, 7 (1975). The
Court, through its use of the "clear and present danger" test, attempted to view the obscenity ques-
tion in terms of recognized concerns and interests of the state rather than from a moral stance.
These state interests included juvenile well-being and the right to privacy. Id.
70. Redrup, 386 U.S. at 769.
71. 394 U.S. 557 (1969). At issue in Stanley were films that were taken from defendant's pri-
vate residence.
72. Rosenblum, supra note 69, at 9. In Stanley the Court balanced first amendment rights and
the right of privacy against the competing interest of the state "in protecting its citizens from the
abuses of pornography." Id.
73. Rosenblum, supra note 69, at 9.
74. The opinion in Stanley was written by Justice Marshall and joined by Justices Douglas and
Harlan. Justices Stewart, Brennan, and White all concurred on other grounds. See Rosenblum,
supra note 69, at 9 n.42. For a general discussion of the Justices' differing views, see supra note 67.
75. By 1973, when Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), was decided, there were four new
Justices who took the place in the majority of the four members of the Warren Court that had
rendered the Stanley decision in 1969. The four new Justices were Chief Justice Burger, and Justices
Powell, Blackmun, and Rehnquist.
76. 413 U.S. 15 (1973). Defendant in Miller was convicted for knowingly distributing obscene
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
its burden of review by establishing new guidelines designed to limit its role as
"sole arbiter of what was and was not obscene."'77 Chief Justice Burger, writing
for the majority, announced:
The basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a) whether "the
average person, applying contemporary community standards" would
find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest,
... (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive
way, sexual conduct specially defined by the applicable state law; and
(c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value.... If a state law that regulates obscene
material is thus limited, as written or construed, the First Amendment
values applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment are
adequately protected by the ultimate power of appellate courts to con-
duct an independent review of constitutional claims when necessary.78
Although leaving to the states the ultimate task of formulating regulatory legis-
lation,79 Burger did give some examples of what might be regulated under part
(b) of the new standard. These examples included "(a) Patently offensive repre-
sentations or descriptions of ultimate sexual acts, normal or perverted, actual or
simulated [and] (b) Patently offensive representations or depictions of masturba-
tion, excretory functions, and lewd exhibitions of the genitals." 80 In addition,
the Miller test expressly rejected the "utterly without redeeming social value"
test of Memoirs in favor of the more restrictive "literary, artistic, political, or
scientific value" test.8 1 Further, the Court rejected a "national standard" in
favor of the stated "contemporary community standards."'82
In general, the Miller doctrine represented a retreat by the Court from its
earlier activist role in the obscenity area.8 3 As the Court noted in Paris Adult
Theatre I v. Slaton,8 4 a companion case to Miller, it recognized a legitimate state
interest in curbing obscenity in society. The Court stated, "[r]ights and interests
'other than those of the advocates are involved.'... These include the interest
matter, a misdemeanor under California's penal code. The conviction centered on defendant's con-
duct in causing unsolicited brochures advertising four books titled Intercourse, Man-Woman, Sex
Orgies Illustrated, and An Illustrated History of Pornography, and a film entitled "Marital Inter-
course" to be mailed to a restaurant in Newport Beach, California. Id. at 16-18. Defendant's con-
duct was judged under the Memoirs test at the trial level, and the Supreme Court remanded the case
for review under the newly stated Miller standard. Id. at 21-37.
77. Hardy, supra note 52, at 224.
78. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24-25.
79. Id. at 25.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 37.
82. Id.
83. Hardy, supra note 52, at 224-25.
84. 413 U.S. 49 (1973). In Paris the Atlanta, Georgia district attorney filed a civil proceeding
to enjoin defendants from exhibiting several films in their movie theater. The outside of the theater
had no visual obscene advertisements and it warned that no minors were allowed inside. It also
warned that the films depicted nude bodies. The trial judge dismissed the complaints on grounds
that exhibiting the films in a commercial theater with requisite notice of their content was constitu-
tionally permissible. Id. at 50-53. The Georgia Supreme Court unanimously reversed, finding the
films without constitutional protection. Id. at 53. The United States Supreme Court supported the
Georgia Supreme Court in holding the circumstances of exhibition irrelevant, but vacated and re-
manded the decision for consideration under the Miller standard. Id. at 69-70.
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of the public in the quality of life and the total community environment, the tone
of commerce in the great city centers, and, possibly, the public safety itself."85
This broadly stated interest opened the door to constitutional state regulation of
obscenity. Thus, the Supreme Court, rather than reviewing each decision on its
facts, confined its role to determining the constitutionality of the applicable stat-
utes under the Miller test.86
Protecting minors from obscenity has long been recognized as a legitimate
state interest.8 7 In Mishkin v. New York 8 the Supreme Court recognized that
"the prurient-appeal requirement of the Roth test is satisfied if the dominant
theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to the prurient interest in sex of
members of that group."'8 9 In Ginsberg v. New York 90 the Court applied this
reasoning to minors in upholding a New York statute defining obscenity on the
basis of its appeal to minors. 9 1 Writing for the majority, Justice Brennan re-
marked, "[t]hat the State has power to make that adjustment seems clear, for we
have recognized that even where there is an invasion of protected freedoms 'the
power of the state to control the conduct of children reaches beyond the scope of
its authority over adults.' "92 The holding in Ginsberg was, in effect, a reaffirma-
tion of Redrup, which had earlier identified a legitimate state concern for
juveniles. 93
More recently, the Supreme Court in New York v. Ferber 94 recognized that
a state has a compelling interest in protecting its children from sexual exploita-
tion.95 In Ferber a bookstore owner was indicted under a New York statute for
selling films showing young boys masturbating.96 The trial court found Ferber
guilty of promoting a sexual performance by a child. 97 The statute defined "sex-
ual performance" as "any performance or part thereof which includes sexual
conduct by a child less than sixteen years of age,"'98 and "sexual conduct" as
"actual or simulated intercourse, deviate sexual intercourse, sexual bestiality,
masturbation, sado-masochistic abuse, or lewd exhibition of the genitals." 99 Af-
ter the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court affirmed, the New
York Court of Appeals reversed, holding the statute violative of the first amend-
ment.1°° New York's high court found the statute underinclusive and over-
85. Id. at 58.
86. Hardy, supra note 52, at 225-26.
87. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168 (1944).
88. 383 U.S. 502 (1966).
89. Id. at 508. In Mishkin the group referred to was homosexuals.
90. 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
91. Id. at 638.
92. Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 638 (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944)).
93. See supra text accompanying note 70.
94. 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
95. Id. at 756-57.
96. Id. at 751-52.
97. Id; see N.Y. PENAL LAW § 263.15 (McKinney 1980).
98. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 263.00(1) (McKinney 1980).
99. Id. § 263.00(3).
100. People v. Ferber, 52 N.Y.2d 674, 422 N.E.2d 523, 439 N.Y.S.2d 863 (1981), rev'd, 458 U.S.
747 (1982).
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broad, noting that, as applied, "the statute would.., prohibit the promotion of
materials traditionally entitled to constitutional protection from government in-
terference under the First Amendment."10 1
The United States Supreme Court began its review in Ferber by considering
whether a state may exercise greater restrictions-beyond those allowed by
Miller-on works portraying sexual acts or lewd exhibitions of genitalia by chil-
dren. 10 2 The Court held that the states could in fact regulate these materials
and cited five factors in support of its holding. First, Justice White, writing for
the majority, re-emphasized the state's compelling interest in "safeguarding the
physical and psychological well-being of a minor." 10 3 The Court cited studies
describing the harm to children from their use as subjects of pornographic
materials, 10 4 and found the judgment of these studies to pass first amendment
scrutiny. 105 Second, the Court found that the dissemination of child pornogra-
phy was "intrinsically related to the sexual abuse of children." 106 Third, the
Court cited the economic motive for production of child pornography inherent
in the sale and advertising of such materials.10 7 Fourth, the Court found that
any value in permitting live performances and visual representations of children
engaging in lewd sexual conduct was "exceedingly modest, if not de mini-
mus."108 Last, consistent with earlier decisions, the Court found child pornog-
raphy to be outside the protection of the first amendment,10 9 and re-affirmed
content as determinative of whether first amendment protection was
applicable. 110
The Ferber Court also rejected claims that the New York statute was overly
broad and should therefore be held invalid on its face.1  I The overbreadth doc-
trine is recognized to safeguard protected expression when" 'persons whose ex-
101. Id. at 678, 422 N.E.2d at 525, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 865.
102. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 753.
103. Id. at 756-57.
104. Id. at 758 n.9. "It has been found that sexually exploited children are unable to develop
healthy affectionate relations in later life, have sexual dysfunctions, and have a tendency to become
sexual abusers as adults." Id; see also sources cited supra note 6 (demonstrating harm caused to
sexually exploited children).
105. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 758.
106. Id. at 759. The Court noted that "the materials produced are a permanent record of the
children's participation and the harm to the child is exacerbated by their circulation." Id. The
Court also noted that distribution must be halted if production is to be controlled. Id.
107. Id. at 761.
108. Id. at 762. The Court found it "unlikely that visual depictions of children performing sex-
ual acts or lewdly exhibiting their genitals would often constitute an important and necessary part of
a literary performance or scientific or educational work." Id. at 762-63.
109. Id. at 763.
110. Id. (citing Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 66 (1976)).
111. Id. at 773. The New York Court of Appeals-New York's highest court-had struck down
the statute for overbreadth. The court of appeals explained:
[T]he statute would prohibit the showing of any play or movie in which a child portrays a
defined sexual act, real or simulated, in a nonobscene manner. It would also prohibit the
sale, showing, or distributing of medical or educational materials containing photographs
of such acts. Indeed, by its terms, the statute would prohibit those who oppose such por-
trayals from providing illustrations of what they oppose.
People v. Ferber, 52 N.Y.2d 674, 678, 422 N.E.2d 523, 525, 439 N.Y.S.2d 863, 865 (1981), rev'd, 458
U.S. 747 (1982).
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pression is constitutionally protected may well refrain from exercising their
rights for fear of criminal sanctions by a statute susceptible of application to
protected expression.' "112 In Ferber the Court reiterated its position that" 'the
overbreadth of a statute must not only be real, but substantial as well, judged in
relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep.' "113 In holding the statute not
overly broad, Justice White noted "We consider this the paradigmatic case of a
state statute whose legitimate reach dwarfs its arguably impermissible
applications." 114
In sum, when minors are involved the Supreme Court has allowed regula-
tion of materials depicting sexual activity that would not necessarily be deemed
obscene under the standard articulated in Miller. Also, child pornography stat-
utes will be invalidated for overbreadth only if a showing of substantial over-
breadth, in contradiction to first amendment freedoms, is made. 15 The Court's
recognition of a state's compelling interest in protecting children from the harm
attached to child pornography virtually assures that regulatory schemes which
seek to control such materials will be upheld.
Having discussed the background of Supreme Court decisions in the ob-
scenity and child pornography areas, it is now appropriate to examine the con-
stitutional ramifications of the recent amendments to North Carolina's obscenity
law. The Supreme Court has set up general guidelines for the fashioning of
obscenity statutes and has largely distanced itself from the factual determination
of obscenity.1 16 Therefore, a constitutional analysis of a particular state statute
necessarily focuses on the language of the statute.117
With respect to the North Carolina amendments, it first should be noted
that the deletion of the public place requirement is of little constitutional signifi-
cance. Although the amendments made the intentional dissemination of ob-
scene material unlawful, they did not attempt to prohibit mere possession of
such materials. 118 The Stanley decision made clear that "mere private posses-
112. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 768 (quoting Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 521 (1972)).
113. Id. at 770 (quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973)).
114. Id. at 773.
115. Id. at 769.
116. Hardy, supra note 52, at 225-28. Professor Hardy views the Miller opinion as "susceptible
to two alternative interpretations of the form and scope of the Supreme Court's review." Id. at 225.
Under the "deferential" interpretation the Court would assume that first amendment values are
adequately protected if correct instructions are given to the jury. The Court would therefore restrict
its review to the jury charge and the constitutionality of the applicable state statute. Id. at 225-26.
"[Tihe jury finding of obscenity would constitute an issue of fact from which no 'constitutional
claim' reviewable by the Supreme Court would arise." Id. at 226.
Under the "discretionary de novo" alternative, "the Court will review not only the specificity of
obscenity statutes but also undertake a full review of the finding of obscenity when the Court consid-
ers it appropriate." Id. at 228.
117. The enforcement of a statute may have separate constitutional implications. Enforcement
decisions in this area arguably will be subject to question in many situations because of the highly
subjective nature of the obscenity standard, which focuses on "patent offensiveness" and "appeal to
prurient interest."
118. See Act of July 11, 1985, ch. 703, § 1, 1985 N.C. Sess. Laws 929, 929-30 (codified at N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 14-190.1 (Supp. 1985)). The amended statute reads in part, "(a) It shall be unlawful
for any person, firm, or corporation to intentionally disseminate obscenity." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-
190.1 (Supp. 1985).
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sion of obscene matter cannot constitutionally be made a crime."'1 19 Because the
amended statute does not attempt to limit possession, no constitutional problem
arises. Although the amended statute arguably raises some privacy concerns-
for example, whether there is a violation when an individual gives an obscene
publication to a friend in his or her home-the likelihood of enforcement in such
situations seems to be de minimus.
Unlike the deletion of the public place requirement, the change from a
statewide standard to a community standard could generate legitimate constitu-
tional challenges. Although Miller expressly rejected a national standard in
favor of community standards, 120 it is highly doubtful that the Court anticipated
a statute authorizing different interpretations of obscenity within an individual
state. The fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits a
state from "[denying] to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws." 121 Commentators have noted, "if the means the law employs to
achieve its ends is the classification of persons for differing benefits or burdens, it
will be tested under the equal protection guarantee."' 122
The equal protection clause "introduced a new concept into constitutional
analysis by requiring that individuals be treated in a manner similar to others as
an independent constitutional guarantee."' 123 The essence of an equal protection
challenge is that the legislature has created unequal burdens and benefits
through the application of an unreasonable classification that does not further a
legitimate state interest.' 24 Although North Carolina's amended obscenity law
does not classify based on gender, race, or religion, it effectively classifies people
according to the county in which they live or do business. For example, under
the amended statute store owners in Orange County may enjoy first amendment
protection in the dissemination of particular works, whereas store owners in
Wake County may face prosecution for distributing the same material.' 25 This
type of regulation goes beyond the scope of allowable prosecutorial discretion
and creates uncertainty about what standard will be applied in different areas of
the state. It is unreasonable to require distributors of arguably obscene materials
to determine those counties in which their publications will be protected by the
first amendment and those in which they will not be protected when each county
purports to enforce the same law.
The deletion of the word "statewide" in the setting of the new standard
evinces clear legislative intent to allow individual communities to apply their
119. Stanley, 394 U.S. at 559.
120. Miller, 413 U.S. at 37.
121. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added).
122. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 586 (2d ed. 1983).
123. Id. at 585.
124. See Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 341, 365-66
(1949) (describing equal protection as the goal of the legislature and the focal point of judicial
review).
125. See Jenkins, X-rated videos return to Orange, Chatham; local standards cited, News and
Observer (Raleigh, N. C.), Jan. 27, 1986, at IA, col. 3 (discussing the community standard provision
of the amended statute and noting that certain movies found to be obscene in Durham and Wake
Counties have been left on the shelves in Orange and Chatham Counties).
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own standards. The North Carolina courts, however, may continue to require a
statewide standard in their interpretation of the statute. Such an interpretation
would protect the statute from an equal protection challenge; however, it would
be contrary to the clear legislative intent.
The amended statute's definition of obscenity clearly parallels the Miller
formulation and appears to define the prohibited materials with the required
specificity. 12 6 The addition of simulated intercourse in the definition of sexual
conduct1 27 is of limited importance and appears to be aimed at reducing eviden-
tiary problems in the prosecution of obscenity offenses. Thus, even after the
amendments, the requirements of patent offensiveness and appeal to prurient
interest are still the determinative factors in an obscenity inquiry.12 8
The amendments' elimination of the adversary hearing prior to seizure 129
also should not present a constitutional problem. Miller held that the constitu-
tion does not require such a hearing, and the discretion of the prosecutor in
applying for warrants130 should curb overzealous police enforcement. The nor-
mal requirements inherent in the issuance of a warrant for seizure of materials
or criminal process are not disrupted. Thus, due process is not affected. The
trier of fact will still make the ultimate determination of obscenity.
The child protection amendments raise another set of constitutional ques-
tions. First, can state legislatures constitutionally prohibit the dissemination or
display of materials to minors when the materials do not meet the Miller defini-
tion of obscenity? One commentator has noted:
[I]n Ginsberg, the Court held that the determination [of obscenity] is to
be made by the state legislature-at least when obscenity with respect
to minors is at issue-subject only to the requirement that the Court
must find the legislature's judgment rational.... [T]he Ginsberg Court
approved the definition of obscenity for minors in terms of harm. 13 1
Therefore, the individual states have considerable authority to regulate what mi-
nors may be exposed to when sexual subjects are concerned. The Ginsberg rul-
ing is supported by the more recent holding in Ferber,132 which recognized that
the Miller standard was insufficient to deal with the child pornography prob-
lem. 133 Controversy over the rationality of the new amendments will likely fo-
cus on the definition of sexually explicit nudity. The amended statutes define
sexually explicit nudity as "The showing of: (a) Uncovered, or less than
opaquely covered, human genitals, pubic area, or buttocks, or the nipple or any
portion of the areola of the human female breast; or (b) Covered human male
126. See Miller, 413 U.S. at 24 ("That conduct must be specifically defined by the applicable
state law, as written or authoritatively construed.").
127. Act of July 11, 1985, ch. 703, § 1, 1985 N.C. Sess. Laws 929, 929 (codified at N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 14-190.1(c)(1) (Supp. 1985)).
128. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-190.1(b) (Supp. 1985).
129. Act of July 11, 1985, ch. 703, § 2, 1985 N.C. Sess. Laws 929, 930.
130. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-190.20 (Supp. 1985).
131. Engdahl, Requiem for Roth: Obscenity Doctrine is Changing, 68 MICH. L. REV. 185, 196-
97 (1969).
132. See Ferber, 458 U.S. at 747.
133. Id. at 756.
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genitals in a discernibly turgid state." 134 The level of enforcement will likely
determine whether this definition is rational. If the amended statute is strictly
construed and literally enforced, certain advertisements and motion pictures
could be deemed obscene. Such a result might trigger arguments over the ra-
tionality of the amendments. Leaving the "harmful to minors" determination in
the hands of the jury should not pose constitutional problems. Such a scheme is
sanctioned by Miller, which asserts that any first amendment issues should be
properly protected by appellate review.135
The provisions of the amendments dealing with direct and indirect sexual
exploitation of children clearly are sanctioned by the Court's ruling in Ferber.
The New York statute13 6 reviewed by the Court in Ferber is markedly similar to
the amended North Carolina law. Both statutes criminalize the use of material
showing children in live sexual performances or the production of material
showing children engaged in sexual activity. 137 The two statutes diverge, how-
ever, in their treatment of the mistake of age defense. The New York statute
allows mistake of age as an affirmative defense when the defendant can show a
"good faith reasonable belief" that the child was older than sixteen.' 38 North
Carolina allows no such defense 139 and this rule may raise scienter problems. 4°
However, it is likely that the state's compelling interest in combatting sexual
exploitation and assuring the safety and welfare of its children will overcome
any defense based on lack of scienter on review.' 41
The New York and North Carolina statutes also differ in their approach to
proving that an actor in a visual representation is a minor. New York requires a
showing of proof,142 but North Carolina allows an inference of minority when
the material "represents or depicts" a minor.143 Again, the compelling interest
of the state probably justifies this inference. Ferber stressed the need for specific-
ity and definition in this type of regulation, 144 and the North Carolina statute
134. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-190.13(6) (Supp. 1985).
135. Miller, 413 U.S. at 25.
136. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 263 (McKinney 1980).
137. Compare N.Y. PENAL LAW § 263.05 (McKinney 1980) (prohibiting use of a child in sexual
performance) and N.Y. PENAL LAW § 263.10 (McKinney 1980) (prohibiting promotion of a sexual
performance by a child) with N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-190.16 (Supp. 1985) (prohibiting the use, em-
ployment, and inducement of a child in sexual activity for the purpose of producing a visual
representation).
138. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 263.20(1) (McKinney 1980).
139. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-190.16(c) (Supp. 1985) (concerning first degree sexual exploita-
tion of a minor); id. § 14-190.17(c) (concerning second degree sexual exploitation of a minor).
140. "Scienter" is defined as "knowingly," and it is "frequently used to signify the defendant's
guilty knowledge." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1207 (5th ed. 1979). In Ferber Justice White noted,
"As with obscenity laws, criminal responsibility may not be imposed without some element of scien-
ter on the part of the defendant." Ferber, 458 U.S. at 765. If the only circumstance that makes an
act an offense under the North Carolina obscenity law is the age of a participant, the language in
Ferber would require that the accused know that he or she was dealing with a minor.
141. See supra notes 87-115 and accompanying text (discussing the state's compelling interest in
protecting the health and safety of its minors).
142. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 263.25 (McKinney 1980).
143. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-190.16(b), .17(b) (Supp. 1985).
144. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 764. "The category of'sexual conduct' proscribed must also be suitably
limited and described." Id.
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appears adequate in this sense. The inclusion of the mistake of age and inference
sections in the statute may well be deemed as notice to those involved in the
proscribed activities and further strengthens the constitutional legitimacy of the
amended statute.
As with similar statutes, overbreadth is an issue that undoubtedly will be
raised in attacks on the constitutionality of the amended statute. As Justice
White stated in the Ferber decision, "the overbreadth doctrine is 'strong
medicine' and [we] have employed it with hesitation, and then 'only as a last
resort.'"145 The Supreme Court requires that "substantial" overbreadth be
proven before a statute will be found invalid on its face. 146 Any such over-
breadth will also be judged against the legitimate purposes of the statute. 147
Once again, it is likely that the North Carolina courts will recognize the compel-
ling interest of the state in protecting its youth and discount the infringement on
first amendment freedoms due to overbreadth.
In conclusion, practitioners should be aware that attempts to invalidate the
new obscenity statute on equal protection grounds could trigger varying scena-
rios on review. The Miller decision allows state statutes to meet its regulatory
guidelines "as written or construed," thus allowing state courts to interpret stat-
utes in a manner consistent with constitutional guarantees. If the North Caro-
lina Supreme Court finds the local community standard approach-as intended
by the general assembly-to be inconsistent with equal protection requirements,
it will face an interesting problem of statutory construction.
First, the court might choose to interpret the contemporary community
standard as a statewide standard. Although this clearly would violate the intent
of the general assembly, 148 which is usually deemed controlling in statutory in-
terpretation, 14 9 it would allow the court to avoid the equal protection attack.
The statute would meet the Miller test through a constitutional construction of a
statute also capable of an unconstitutional construction. 150
Second, the court might choose to attach the intended meaning to the con-
temporary community standard and invalidate the obscenity statute as unconsti-
tutional. If the court applies the intended meaning, invalidation of the entire
statute would appear necessary due to the inseparability of the unconstitutional
standard and the remainder of the statute.15 1 In so doing, the court would be
145. Id. at 769 (quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973)).
146. Id. at 770.
147. Id.
148. The intent of the general assembly clearly was to do away with the statewide standard as
evidenced by the deletion of the word "statewide" in the new obscenity standard. Compare Act of
July 1, 1971, ch. 405, 1971 N.C. Sess. Laws 334 (adopting the "statewide" element of the obscenity
standard), amended by Act of July 11, 1985, ch. 703, 1985 N.C. Sess. Laws 929, with N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 14-190.1 (Supp. 1985) (deleting the word "statewide").
149. See State v. Hart, 287 N.C. 76, 80, 213 S.E.2d 291, 294-95 (1975); State v. Johnson, 278
N.C. 126, 137, 179 S.E.2d 371, 383 (1971).
150. When a statute is susceptible to two interpretations, one constitutional, the other unconsti-
tutional, the constitutional interpretation should be adopted. In re Arthur, 291 N.C. 640, 641-42,
231 S.E.2d 614, 615-18 (1977); Smith v. Keator, 285 N.C. 530, 534, 206 S.E.2d 203, 206, appeal
dismissed, 419 U.S. 1043 (1974).
151. When the unconstitutional provisions cannot be separated from the constitutional provi-
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striking down a statute that the general assembly supported almost unani-
mously,152 forcing the general assembly to amend the law' 53 in accordance with
equal protection guarantees.
As this analysis suggests, the North Carolina Supreme Court faces an un-
pleasant dilemma in interpreting the new obscenity statute. The statute in its
present form, however, should not be upheld due to the uncertain message it
delivers from county to county. The public deserves a higher degree of predict-
ability in the enforcement of criminal statutes, and citizens should not be sub-
jected to unequal applications of state law beyond the scope of permissible
prosecutorial discretion. Although the United States Supreme Court has mani-
fested its belief in a state's compelling interest in curbing obscenity and child
pornography, it requires that regulatory schemes be specific and adequately
defined.
Beyond the equal protection problem, the statute appears to be in line with
current obscenity doctrine. Although some will continue to argue that these
types of statutes represent censorship and impermissible restrictions on free
speech, the Court in its current makeup will continue to distinguish protected
from unprotected speech on the basis of content. The level of enforcement will
likely determine the perceived rationality of North Carolina's new regulations,
and the heightened importance of the district attorney in making enforcement
decisions should be noted.15 4 The extent to which district attorneys in North
Carolina pursue the perpetrators of obscenity and child pornography under the
amended statute will largely determine the impact of this legislation.
JOSEPH SPOOR TURNER, III
sions of a statute, the entire statute must be invalidated. G.I. Surplus Store, Inc. v. Hunter, 257 N.C.
206, 214, 125 S.E.2d 764, 769-70 (1962).
152. The North Carolina House of Representatives originally passed the Act by a vote of 97 to 3.
The North Carolina Senate subsequently added five amendments to the Act and passed it by a vote
of 45 to 2. The Act was returned to the house where each of the senate's amendments were voted on
and passed individually. The votes on the amendments ranged from 81 to 0, to 81 to 8. Telephone
interview with Ms. Belle Fite, Librarian, North Carolina General Assembly (September 19, 1986).
153. Amending a statute can obviate the constitutional objection and has the effect of reenacting
the statute. See Great Am. Ins. Co. v. High, 264 N.C. 752, 755, 142 S.E.2d 681, 683 (1965).
154. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-190.20 (Supp. 1985); see also Jenkins, supra note 125 (discussing
the community standard provision of the amended statute and the role of district attorneys under
this provision).
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